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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on class actions in the Washington
State courts. It compares and contrasts the Washington experi-
ence with practice under the federal class action rule,1 and
places particular emphasis on the differences between state and
federal practice.
Not all of Washington's divergences from federal class
action practice are commendable. For example, the seemingly
common practice of deferring class certification rulings until
after the merits of the case are resolved makes the class action
device less useful than it could otherwise be2 and raises potential
problems with the fairness of the class action process.3 Most of
the differences between Washington and federal class action
practice, however, reflect positively on Washington's exper-
iences. In contrast to the mixed experience with class actions in
the federal courts," class actions in Washington seem to be work-
ing, and working well. Perhaps, therefore, this Article will serve
a useful function, not only for Washington practitioners, but
also for federal judges and practitioners who wish to find ways of
maximizing the potential of the class action device as a useful
procedural tool for resolving complex litigation.
* Professor of Law, Washburn University. B.A., College of Wooster, 1970; J.D.,
Temple University, 1974; LL.M., Temple University, 1979. The author wishes to
acknowledge the assistance in the preparation of this Article of David V. Igliozzi of the
class of 1986 at Washburn University School of Law.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23; WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 23.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 101-02.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 103 & 175.
4. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lom-
bard, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the class action device as a "Frankenstein Monster"),
vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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II. BACKGROUND
Historically, the State of Washington has experimented
with at least three different class action rules. In 1854 Washing-
ton adopted the so-called Field Code version of the class action
rule.5 That provision, for reasons not clear to this author, has
never been explicitly repealed, although no modern cases refer
to or rely on it. 6 In 1960 Washington adopted the language of
the then existent federal rule 23,7 under which the federal courts
5. The Field Code derives its name from its principal author, David Dudley Field. C.
CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 22 (1947). It was known more officially
as the New York Code of 1848 and was the pattern used by many other states, including
Washington, for their own procedural codes. Id. at 24. See WASH. REV. CODE chs. 4.04, .08
(1983). The Washington class action provision, which is virtually identical to the New
York Code provision, is headed: "One or more may sue or defend for others similarly
situated." The provision reads as follows: "When the question is one of common or gen-
eral interest to many persons, or where the parties are numerous and it is impracticable
to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the
whole." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.70 (1983). See infra note 6. The federal courts adopted a
similar class action rule in 1912 but substituted a conjunctive connector for the disjunc-
tive "or" between the "common question" and "numerosity" requirements. Fed. Equity
R. 38, 226 U.S. 649, 659 (1912).
6. The Washington Superior Court Civil Rules are generally quite explicit about
whether they supersede or supplement prior code provisions on the same subject. For
example, a comment following Washington Superior Court Civil Rule 20 (CR 20)
explains that "[t]ogether with Rules 19 and 21, Rule 20 supersedes RCW 4.08.130."
WASH. SUP. CT. Civ. R. ANN. 20 (1977). CR 22 provides that "[tihe remedy herein pro-
vided is in addition to and in no way supersedes or limits the remedy provided by RCW
4.08.150 to 4.08.180, inclusive." WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 22(b). Although there is no appar-
ent reason why CR 23, the class action rule, would not supersede the prior code provision
(otherwise the very specific and exacting prerequisites of CR 23 would easily be under-
mined by the more general requirements of the code provision), there are no comments,
either in the rule itself or elsewhere, about the effect of the rule on the prior code
provision.
7. The pertinent provisions of the then existing federal rule, which Washington
adopted as rule 23 of its Rules of Pleading Practice and Procedure, were as follows:
(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them,
one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on
behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be
enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which
do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought.
(c) DISMISSAL OR COMPROMISE. A class action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be
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had labored since 1938.8 In 1966 federal rule 23 was amended to
eliminate some of its perceived inadequacies,9 and in 1967 the
Washington Supreme Court adopted those amendments verba-
tim in its new Superior Court Civil Rules. 10
Not surprisingly, the Washington courts have indicated that
they would look to federal precedents for guidance in construing
the Washington class action rule.'1 The emphasis, however,
should be on the word guidance; the Washington courts do not
feel "bound" by federal class action precedents. 2  And while
divergences from federal precedent are few in number, they
illustrate a significantly "looser" view of the class action device
than is found in federal practice."3
enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of
the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the
class in such manner as the court directs. If the right is one defined in
paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be given only if the court
requires it.
J. MOORE & H. FINK, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE RULES PAMPHLET 529-30 (1968).
8. The word "labored" may be an understatement. See infra note 9.
9. The problems that courts had applying the provision of the original federal rule
23 were immense. In the Advisory Committee notes to the 1966 amendments the first
section is headed: "Difficulties with the original rule." The section takes up one page of a
five-page note. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note. Professor Kaplan, who
was the reporter to the Advisory Committee that produced the 1966 amendments to
federal rule 23, described the process the committee went through in amending rule 23.
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 386-400 (1967).
10. WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 23.
11. See, e.g., Johnson v. Moore, 80 Wash. 2d 531, 536, 496 P.2d 334, 337 (1972)
(court used federal precedent to construe CR 23(a)(2) questions of fact or law common
to the class; plaintiffs were persons held in city jail "on suspicion" suing for unlawful
seizure); Brown v. Brown, 6 Wash. App. 249, 254, 492 P.2d 581, 585 (1971) (court cited
federal cases construing federal rule 23(a) in a case in which an electric company's con-
sumers sought class action certification because they could not afford individual
lawsuits).
12. See, e.g., Darling v. Champion Home Builders Co., 96 Wash. 2d 701, 706, 638
P.2d 1249, 1251 (1982) ("Although we may look to federal decisions for guidance in inter-
preting our civil rules, . . . we are by no means bound by those decisions."). While state
courts are free to interpret their own class action rule any way they wish, subject only to
whatever constitutional limitations might be superimposed on their judicial system, see
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (states may attach whatever labels they choose
and whatever consequences they deem appropriate to litigation brought in their courts,
subject only to the requirements of the Constitution of the United States), some state
courts give a great deal of weight to federal interpretations of the federal class action
rule, citing federal cases almost interchangeably with their state precedent. See, e.g.,
Borwick v. Bober, 34 Colo. App. 423, 428, 529 P.2d 1351,1353-54 (1974) (court cited both
federal and state cases as precedent requiring the denial of class certification for failure
to meet the prerequisites of rule 23(a)).
13. For example, the Washington courts appear to take a significantly more liberal
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III. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
A class action is maintainable under Washington Superior
Court Civil Rule 23 (CR 23) only if all four prerequisites of sub-
division (a) are met, along with any one of the alternative
requirements of subdivision (b).
A. CR 23(a) Prerequisites
CR 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as repre-
sentative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
The requirement of "numerosity" in CR 23(a)(1) is rarely
mentioned by the Washington courts. When numerosity is men-
tioned, it is only discussed in passing. Zimmer v. City of Seat-
position on the appealability of orders denying class certification. Compare Brown v.
Brown, 6 Wash. App. 249, 254, 492 P.2d 581, 584 (1971) (writ of mandamus is an appro-
priate remedy to review lower court grant or denial of class action status) with Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 (1978) (neither collateral order exception nor
death knell doctrine supports appellate jurisdiction; an interlocutory order denying class
status is not a final judgment within 28 U.S.C. 1291). On the availability of defendant
class actions, compare Washington Educ. Ass'n v. Shelton School Dist. No. 309, 93
Wash. 2d 783, 790, 613 P.2d 769, 774 (1980) (use of standing and venue requirements to
deny certification of a CR 23(b)(2) defendant class action was inappropriate) with La
Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 462 (9th Cir. 1973) (use of standing
requirement to deny certification of a defendant class action appropriate) and Paxman v.
Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (defendant class action not permitted
under rule 23(b)(2)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 129 (1981). For further discussion of these
problems, see infra notes 199-206 & 219-31 and accompanying text.
The Washington courts seem to agree with the federal courts that class certification
questions should be decided at an early stage in the lawsuit, ordinarily before the merits
are reached. See, e.g., Washington Educ. Ass'n v. Shelton School Dist. No. 309, 93 Wash.
2d 783, 790, 613 P.2d 769, 773 (1980) (CR 12 motions ordinarily should not be deter-
mined before class status). See also Jiminez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 697-98 (7th
Cir. 1975) (trial court judge should determine class at earliest practicable time), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). However, the Washington appellate courts do in practice
tolerate a less stringent view of the timing requirements for class certification. See, e.g.,
Arment v. Henry, 98 Wash. 2d 775, 777, 658 P.2d 663, 664 (1983) (disciplinary hearing
for inmates may proceed before class status is determined); Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Sno-
homish County, 32 Wash. App. 279, 280, 647 P.2d 43, 45 (1983) (summary judgment
granted before class status determined). For further discussion of this problem, see infra
notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
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tie 4 contains the most extensive discussion of numerosity: two
short paragraphs conclude that numerosity is satisfied when
some potential class members are unidentifiable because joinder
of the unidentifiable members is inherently impracticable. s
The requirement of "typicality" in CR 23(a)(3) has also
received little attention from the Washington courts. The lower
fqderal courts have long been divided on the intended meaning
and significance of the typicality prerequisite. 6 Some federal
courts have concluded that the typicality requirement substan-
tially overlaps with the commonality requirement, 7 or the ade-
quacy of representation requirement, 8 or both.'9 Other federal
14. 19 Wash. App. 864, 578 P.2d 548 (1978).
15. Id. at 868, 578 P.2d at 550. Generally, the federal cases are in agreement with
Washington cases on this point. See, e.g., Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d
1014, 1022 (5th Cir.) (employment discrimination action in which members of class
included future and deterred applicants who were necessarily unidentifiable and thus
made joinder impracticable), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Holland v. Steele, 92
F.R.D. 58, 63 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (smaller numbers are less objectionable when plaintiff
seeks relief for future members as well as past and present members). However, in mak-
ing numerosity determinations, the federal courts look at a number of other factors as
well. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 95 F.R.D. 168, 174-75 (D. Del.
1982) (classes of more than 100 members presumptively meet the numerosity require-
ment; geographic distribution of the class is relevant to impracticability of joinder); Esler
v. Northrop Corp., 86 F.R.D. 20, 34 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (smaller damage claims make join-
der less practicable).
16. Duncan v. Tennessee, 84 F.R.D. 21, 30-31 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (citing several
cases that treat rule 23(a)(3) as identical to rule 23(a)(2): Presseisen v. Swarthmore Col-
lege, 71 F.R.D. 34, 42-44 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Grogan v. American Brands, Inc., 70 F.R.D.
579, 581 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Piva v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 378, 385 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Mack v. General Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 76 (E.D. Pa. 1971); also citing several cases
that treat rule 23(a)(3) as synonymous with rule 23(a)(4): Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff,
Inc., 72 F.R.D. 71, 76-77 (E.D. La. 1976); Marshall v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 68
F.R.D. 287, 291-92 (D. Del. 1975); Richmond Black Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Rich-
mond, 386 F. Supp. 151, 158 (E.D. Va. 1974)). The law review commentators have chron-
icled the controversy on several occasions. See, e.g., Comment, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a)(3) Typicality Requirement: The Superfluous Prerequisite to Maintain-
ing a Class Action, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 809 (1981); Note, Federal Civil Procedure-Class
Actions-Rule 23(a)(3) Typicality Requirement Has Independent Meaning, 25 U. KAN.
L. REV. 126 (1976).
17. See, e.g., Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 71 F.R.D. 34, 42-44 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(when an "across the board" or permeating policy is alleged, both requirements are satis-
fied); Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 50 F.R.D. 242, 247 (D.
Conn. 1970) (absence of specification of grievances similar to plaintiff's by other mem-
bers of the class was evidence of lack of commonality and typicality).
18. See, e.g., Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 71, 76-77 (E.D. La. 1976)
(typicality and adequacy of representation requirements were sufficiently related in the
context of this case for the court to discuss them together).
19. Duncan v. Tennessee, 84 F.R.D. 21, 31 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (only consistent prin-
ciple in discrimination cases is that the plaintiff's claim cannot be unique to plaintiff;
this principle applies to commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation).
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courts have insisted that the typicality requirement must have
some meaning independent of the other rule 23(a) requirements,
although they have not always agreed on what that meaning
should be.20 Washington courts have avoided the problem so far
by essentially ignoring the typicality requirement.2
The "adequacy of representation" requirement of CR
23(a)(4) has received some attention from the Washington
courts, but thus far only on a rather superficial level. 22 Washing-
ton courts, like the federal courts,"3 look at the qualifications of
both the representative party and the attorney for that party.
On the question of qualifications of the attorney representing
the class, the Washington court of appeals held in Marquardt v.
Fein24 that the attorney must be an experienced and effective
20. See, e.g., Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 559 (8th Cir. 1982) (typical-
ity provision requires something more than the general conclusory allegations that
unnamed blacks have been discriminated against), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983);
Taylor v. Safeway Stores, 524 F.2d 263, 269-70 (10th Cir. 1975) (typicality provision
requires a comparison of claims or defenses of the representative with the claims or
defenses of the class); White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 415 (D. Colo. 1971)
(typicality provision requires plaintiff to demonstrate that other members of the class he
purports to represent have suffered the same grievances of which he complains). In
Green v. Cauthen, 379 F. Supp. 361 (D.S.C. 1974), the court said that it agreed with the
rationale and holding of White v. Gates Rubber Co., supra this note, even quoting
approvingly from White. Green, 379 F. Supp. at 372-73. However, by taking language
from White out of context, the Green court actually ended up reaching the opposite
conclusion.
21. See, e.g., Johnson v. Moore, 80 Wash. 2d 531, 533, 496 P.2d 334, 335 (1972)
("Nor can there be any doubt that the claims and defenses of the representatives are
typical of those of the class which they represent. ... ); Zimmer v. City of Seattle, 19
Wash. App. 864, 867-70, 578 P.2d 548, 550 (1978) (court did not even mention typicality
requirement before holding that class status was appropriate). Some federal courts have
taken a similar position. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d
Cir. 1968) (court merely stated conclusively that plaintiff's claim was "typical of the
claims . . . of the class"), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
22. E.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 84 Wash. 2d 617, 529 P.2d 438 (1974); Marquardt v.
Fein, 25 Wash. App. 651, 612 P.2d 378 (1980). The Washington courts have not had to
address a number of complex and sensitive issues concerning the adequacy of representa-
tion requirements that the federal courts have struggled to resolve. For instance, to what
extent should the financial status of the class representative be a factor in determining
adequacy of representation? Compare Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 479-80 (10th
Cir. 1974) (in an antitrust action against a foreign manufacturer, plaintiffs were not
required to prove their ability to pay litigation costs), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975)
with Rode v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 76 F.R.D. 229, 231 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (court noted
that while class certification had not been denied solely because of plaintiffs' financial
circumstances, plaintiffs' ability to pay litigation costs was a relevant factor in determin-
ing whether plaintiffs could adequately represent the class).
23. See, e.g., Esler v. Northrop Corp., 86 F.R.D. 20, 36-37 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Folding
Cartons, Inc. v. American Can Co., 79 F.R.D. 698, 701 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
24. 25 Wash. App. 651, 656-57, 612 P.2d 378, 381 (1980).
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representative, must have no interest in the litigation that would
potentially conflict with the interests of the class, and must act
ethically at all times in representing the class. The court upheld
the disqualification of all three attorneys representing a class of
defendants in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. The lead coun-
sel was disqualified because of his representation of other groups
with interests that potentially conflicted with the class interests
and because his representation of the class to date had been
confusing, careless, and unethical.2 5 The other two attorneys
were disqualified for their lack of experience, although the court
did not specify what experience would have qualified them to
represent the class.26 The court did suggest, however, that the
two less experienced attorneys could stay on the case to assist
more experienced counsel.27
On the question of qualifications of the representative
party, the Washington appellate courts have spoken twice. In
DeFunis v. Odegaard,2 a on remand from the United States
Supreme Court's determination that plaintiff's reverse discrimi-
nation claim was moot, 9 the plaintiff sought to re-ignite his
claim by seeking class certification. 0 The Washington Supreme
Court refused certification, in part because of possible conflicts
between plaintiff and the class. The court noted that in view of
the limited number of seats available in the law school entering
class, plaintiff might, at least potentially, become a competitor
with the proposed class rather than its representative."
The Washington Supreme Court also found that the moot-
ness of plaintiff's individual claim removed him from member-
ship in his proposed class and, therefore, that the plaintiff could
not adequately represent a group to which he no longer
25. Id. at 657, 612 P.2d at 382. Among other things, the trial court noted that lead
counsel had written a private letter to the court marked "personal and confidential,"
attempting to persuade the court to adopt counsel's view of the case, and had submitted
voluminous, tardy, and unintelligible pleadings and documents tending to obfuscate
rather than clarify the facts and issues in the case. Id. at 654, 612 P.2d at 380.
26. The other attorneys had each been in practice for three years or less. It would
appear from the court's discussion that the attorneys were disqualified for their general
lack of experience, rather than for lack of specific class action experience. Id.
27. Id. at 656, 612 P.2d at 381.
28. 84 Wash. 2d 617, 529 P.2d 438 (1974).
29. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20, on remand, 84 Wash. 2d 617, 529
P.2d 438 (1974).
30. DeFunis, 84 Wash. 2d at 619, 621, 529 P.2d at 439, 441.
31. Id. at 622-23, 529 P.2d at 441-42.
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belonged.3 2 The court admitted, however, that a more timely
application for certification might have led to a different
result.33 Thus, the court left open the possibility that mere con-
jecture about future conflicts that might develop between the
plaintiff and the class he sought to represent would not alone
suffice to defeat class certification.
3 4
The DeFunis court did not address the possibility that some
members of the proposed class might not share the plaintiff's
goal of challenging affirmative action.3 5 However, in Zimmer v.
City of Seattle, 6 the court of appeals stated explicitly that the
possibility that some class members would prefer the challenged
statute to be upheld would not preclude class certification.37
32. Id. at 623, 529 P.2d at 442.
33. Id.
34. Some federal courts have taken this position, but there has been disagreement
on the issue. Compare Edmondson v. Simon, 86 F.R.D. 375, 382 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (conjec-
ture about possible future conflicts does not .suffice to defeat class certification) with
Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443, 452-53 (M.D. Ga. 1975) (conjecture
about possible future conflicts may suffice to defeat class certification). On the one hand,
any possibility that the class will not be adequately represented should cause the courts
to examine more seriously the propriety of class certification. On the other hand, very
few cases would be appropriate for class certification if mere speculation about the possi-
bility of future conflicts developing between the class and its representative were enough
to justify denying certification. The question is a difficult one. See, e.g., Gill v. Monroe
County Dep't of Social Servs., 95 F.R.D. 518, 521 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (alleged antagonisms
among members of class of black and Spanish-surnamed employees were not sufficiently
serious to decertify class in employment discrimination action).
35. This concern about potential conflicting remedial objectives should be distin-
guished from the problem of competitor conflicts within the class, which the court in
DeFunis did address. A possibility always exists that some class members might not
desire the relief sought by the class representative, particularly in an action for injunc-
tive relief raising questions of broad public interest. That possibility has generally not
been thought to justify denial of class certification. Competition leading to potentially
antagonistic interests among the class members has always been viewed more seriously.
See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 810-11 (5th Cir.) (black
woman asserting that men were favored over women for certain jobs could not represent
a class of all black men and women in an employment discrimination suit), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
36. 19 Wash. App. 864, 578 P.2d 548 (1978).
37. Id. at 870, 578 P.2d at 551. In Zimmer, the class representatives sought to enjoin
the enforcement of a statute authorizing the police to take into custody, without process,
"any child . . . whose surroundings are such as to endanger his health, morals, or wel-
fare, unless immediate action is taken." Id. at 866, 578 P.2d at 549. The defendant
argued that because some members of the class would probably prefer that the statute
be enforced, plaintiff could not adequately represent the class. The court rejected the
argument out of hand. Id. at 870, 578 P.2d at 551. Federal cases addressing the question
have agreed. See, e.g., Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139, 146 (5th Cir. 1974) (class action
requirement that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class" does not mandate that all members of the class be
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Presumably, the possibility of intervention under CR 24 suffices
to protect those persons' interests."s
The Washington courts have focused most of their atten-
tion, with respect to the prerequisites for class certification on
the "commonality" requirement of CR 23(a)(2). Washington
appellate courts have urged trial courts to characterize class
action pleadings liberally to find common questions. For exam-
ple, in Johnson v. Moore,39 one of the more frequently cited
class action precedents, the trial court had refused class certifi-
cation, characterizing the plaintiffs' claim as one for habeas
corpus relief, which would require individualized factual deter-
minations of the reasonableness or necessity of detention of each
class member.4 The supreme court refocused on plaintiffs' claim
for injunctive and declaratory relief, which allowed it to concen-
trate on the more generalized issue of whether the police can
constitutionally detain individuals for an unreasonable period of
time without arraignment, thus finding a common question of
law.4'
Another example of the attitude of the Washington
Supreme Court toward the common-question requirement is
found in Brown v. Brown,4" in which plaintiffs challenged the
defendant city Department of Public Utilities' practice of termi-
nating utility services for disputed arrearages s The trial court
had found commonality lacking because termination of services
might be justified under some factual circumstances but not
under others.4" The supreme court again reversed, finding that a
common question did exist: whether termination of service
based on a disputed unpaid bill was permitted under any cir-
cumstances.45 The court concluded that CR 23 should be con-
strued liberally, not restrictively, to avoid multiplicity of litiga-
tion and promote the remedial purpose behind the rule.45
aggrieved by or desire to challenge the defendant's conduct).
38. See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 677 F.2d 471, 491 (5th Cir.
1982) (federal rule 23 gives district judges great flexibility to adopt and issue appropriate
orders and to invite intervention), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983).
39. 80 Wash. 2d 531, 496 P.2d 334 (1972).
40. Id. at 532-35, 496 P.2d at 335-36.
41. Id.
42. 6 Wash. App. 249, 492 P.2d 581 (1971).
43. Id. at 250, 492 P.2d at 582.
44. Id. at 254-55 n.2, 492 P.2d 584-85 n.2.
45. Id. at 254-55, 492 P.2d at 584-85.
46. Id. at 256-57, 492 P.2d at 586. The Washington courts have also said, however,
that class actions must be maintained "in strict conformity with the requirements of CR
19851
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This same technique was used by the court of appeals to
justify class certification in Zimmer v. City of Seattle.7 The
intermediate appellate court reversed the denial of class certifi-
cation by the trial court, noting that an action challenging a
statute as facially unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness
meets the common-question requirement of CR 23(a)(2) because
the action would not turn on the particular facts of individual
cases.
48
Panorama Residential Protective Association v. Panorama
Corp.'9 is the only case in which the Washington appellate
23." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 84 Wash. 2d 617, 622, 529 P.2d 438, 441 (1974). While this
"strict conformity" language seems to contradict the "liberal construction" language of
Brown, what it really represents is the conflicting pull of several competing policies.
First, there is the efficiency concern of Brown, which attempts to ensure that as many
persons as possible are bound by the class action judgment to avoid repetitive litigation.
Second, there is the remedial policy, also recognized in Brown, of making the courts
more accessible to groups of small claimants who would not be able to afford individual
litigation. Both of these policies support a liberal construction of CR 23. A third policy,
however, underlies the class action prerequisite of CR 23: ensuring that the class action
process adequately protects the interests of absent class members. This third policy
points the other way, dictating careful and strict compliance with the CR 23
prerequisites.
47. 19 Wash. App. 864, 578 P.2d 548 (1978).
48. Id. at 868-69, 578 P.2d at 550-51. The federal courts have not always been as
willing to characterize broadly the issues raised by a plaintiff's claim in order to meet the
common-question requirement. See, e.g., Hayes v. Board of Regents, 495 F.2d 1326, 1329
(6th Cir. 1974). In Hayes, the plaintiff challenged a state practice of refusing to recognize
claims of Kentucky residence for tuition purposes that were based solely on the student's
registration to vote in Kentucky. Id. at 1327. The court refused class certification on the
ground that each class member's residency status would turn on the individual facts of
that student's case. Id. at 1329. Yet, the plaintiff was not basing his own claim or the
class claims on the individual factors in each case. If anything, he was asserting just the
opposite: that once a student's voter registration in Kentucky was established, other fac-
tors should be deemed irrelevant. Thus, under the Washington approach to the common-
question requirement demonstrated in Johnson, Brown, and Zimmer, a common ques-
tion should also have been found in Hayes: namely, whether voter registration in Ken-
tucky should be considered conclusive evidence of Kentucky residence for student tui-
tion purposes.
One reason the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to find a common question in
Hayes may have been because its answer to the common question proposed here was no:
voter registration in Kentucky is not conclusive evidence of Kentucky residence for stu-
dent tuition purposes. That is why the court concluded that each claim of Kentucky
residence would turn on its individual facts.
The problem with the court's apparent approach in this case is that, as indicated
above, no one was making a claim of Kentucky residence based on individual factors.
Once the court decided against the plaintiff the only question raised by him, the case
was over. There were no other questions. Therefore, because the plaintiff's claim did
raise a common question, the court should have certified the class requested by plaintiff
and entered a judgment against plaintiff and the class on that claim.
49. 28 Wash. App. 923, 627 P.2d 121 (1981), aff'd, 97 Wash. 2d 23, 640 P.2d 1057
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courts have found a common question lacking. In Panorama, the
trial court had certified a class action on behalf of two distinct
subclasses of tenants residing in a large retirement community.50
The trial court eventually granted summary judgment in favor
of one subclass, but against the other." With respect to the los-
ing subclass, one issue remained outstanding, a question of
promissory estoppel. The trial court decertified the class on this
issue, concluding that the questions of whether promises had
been made, to whom they were made, and whether or not they
were relied upon to the detriment of the promisee all presented
individual rather than common questions.2 The court of appeals
quite correctly affirmed on this point. 3
B. The Alternative Requirements of CR 23(b)
Very few Washington cases discuss the alternative require-
ments of CR 23(b). 4 Almost all that do are civil rights actions
(1982).
50. Id. at 925, 627 P.2d at 124.
51. Id. at 928, 627 P.2d at 125.
52. Id. at 934, 627 P.2d at 129.
53. Id. The Washington court's position on this point is quite consistent with the
federal precedents on the question. See, e.g., Burnett v. Local 381 Pension Fund, 29 Fed.
R. Serv. 2d 1050, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 1980) (holding that questions of reliance must
be determined on an individual basis).
54. WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 23(b) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concen-
trating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
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for injunctive relief that clearly fit within the parameters of CR
23(b)(2), making extensive discussion of the alternative require-
ments of CR 23(b) unnecessary."
The most complete discussion of the alternative CR 23(b)
requirements is found in Dore v. Kinnear,56 a non-civil rights
case in which the majority found a (b)(2) class action appropri-
ate, 7 although the dissent argued the action ought to have been
certified under CR 23(b)(3).1 s The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
defendant King County taxing authorities from placing on the
property assessment rolls for the year 1971 the revalued assess-
ment of plaintiffs' properties. The representative plaintiffs
argued that the revaluations were not in compliance with a stat-
utorily mandated four-year cyclical reassessment program.59 The
noncompliance allegedly resulted in the imposition of higher
taxes on plaintiffs' properties for a disproportionately longer
period of time than for other property owners, in violation of the
uniformity of taxation clause of the state constitution."0 The
defendants lost on the merits, but argued that relief should run
only to the named plaintiffs because notice of the pendency of
the class suit was never given to the members of the class as
required by CR 23(c)(2)."
likely to be encountered in the management of class action.
55. See, e.g., Robinson v. Peterson, 87 Wash. 2d 665, 666-67, 555 P.2d 1348, 1350
(1976) (class action by inmates seeking to compel promulgation of prison rules and pro-
vision of facilities); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 202-05, 517 P.2d 599, 603-05 (1973)
(permitting class action on behalf of pregnant unemployment insurance applicants);
Johnson v. Moore, 80 Wash. 2d 531, 532-35, 496 P.2d 334, 335-36 (1972) (allowing class
action for individuals held in jail without bringing them promptly before a magistrate);
Zimmer v. City of Seattle, 19 Wash. App. 864, 867-69, 578 P.2d 548, 550-51 (1978) (hold-
ing that class action was appropriate for "dependent children"); Brown v. Brown, 6
Wash. App. 249, 256, 492 P.2d 581, 585-86 (1971) (permitting class action by residential
utility users).
56. 79 Wash. 2d 755, 489 P.2d 898 (1971).
57. Id. at 767, 489 P.2d at 905.
58. Id. at 783-86, 489 P.2d at 914-15 (Stafford, J., dissenting).
59. The statute required that approximately 25% of the property within a county be
revalued each year, resulting in a revaluation of each owner's property every four years.
In 1970 only 6% of the property in King County was reassessed. Id. at 756-57, 489 P.2d
at 899.
60. Id. at 756-57, 489 P.2d at 899-90.
61. Id. at 765, 489 P.2d at 904. WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 23(c)(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
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The majority characterized the suit as a (b)(2) class action
because injunctive relief was sought and because the primary
issue in the case affected all class members in common." Noting
that the mandatory class notice provisions of CR 23(c)(2)
applied only in actions brought under CR 23(b)(3), the majority
concluded that notice to the class was not required by the rule.63
Justice Stafford, in dissent, asserted that the suit was a
(b)(3) class action primarily because the pleadings below and the
statements made by the trial court suggested that a (b)(3) action
was contemplated. 4  He concluded, therefore, that the
mandatory notice provisions of CR 23(c)(2) applied and that the
judgment in favor of the class could not stand because of the
failure to give the requisite notice. 5 Justice Stafford also noted
that some members of the described class could be hurt finan-
cially by the court's decision because their challenged revalua-
tions resulted in lower tax liabilities.6 6 He reasoned, therefore,
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if
he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
62. Dore, 79 Wash. 2d at 766, 489 P.2d at 904. It is not entirely clear that the major-
ity was correct in its characterization of the case as a (b)(2) class action. While the plain-
tiffs did seek injunctive relief, thus seeming to bring the case within CR 23(b)(2), the
class they sought to represent was not a typical "cohesive" (b)(2) class. It appeared, for
example, that some members of the class stood to gain financially from the actions of
defendant challenged by the named plaintiffs. In similar circumstances some federal
courts have refused to certify a (b)(2) class. See, e.g., Pendleton v. Trans Union Sys.
Corp., 76 F.R.D. 192, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (a class must be homogeneous and cohesive in
order to meet the requirement of rule 23(b)(2)).
63. Dore, 79 Wash. 2d at 766, 489 P.2d at 904. The rule itself is clear on this point.
See supra note 61. See also Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 544 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th
Cir.) (holding that rule 23(c)(2) only requires notice to the class in actions brought under
rule 23(b)(3)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
64. Dore, 79 Wash. 2d at 781, 489 P.2d at 912 (Stafford, J., dissenting). Actually, the
trial court never certified a class on the issues in question. Id. at 765, 489 P.2d at 904. It
deferred class certification until trial, a technique that contravenes the spirit, if not the
letter, of CR 23(c)(1), and then never ruled on the matter. Id. The majority upheld class-
wide relief anyway, id. at 767, 489 P.2d at 905, apparently adopting a practice similar to
that of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of allowing class actions to proceed even
though not formally certified. See Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437
(5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that a class action may exist even in the absence of formal,
explicit class determination).
65. Dore, 79 Wash. 2d at 786, 489 P.2d at 916 (Stafford, J., dissenting).
66. Id. Apparently, no one raised the question whether a (b)(1) action would be
appropriate. If the dissent was correct, however, in asserting that some class members
would be harmed financially by the class action judgment, CR 23(b)(1) would seem to be
the correct categorization. Separate actions by individual class members might result in
inconsistent judgments, creating incompatible standards of conduct for defendants and
thus meeting the requirements of CR 23(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, to the extent that a first
individual judgment, as a practical matter disposed of later litigation, the requirements
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that notice would be constitutionally required, even if the suit
were a proper (b)(2) action."'
Two other problems that have arisen in the context of (b)(2)
class actions in the federal courts have been dealt with rather
summarily by the Washington courts. First, in cases in which
the class representative seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a
facially unconstitutional statute, some federal courts have taken
the position that a class action is not needed because injunctive
relief on behalf of the individual representative will inure to the
benefit of the class, even without class certification. 8 In Zimmer
v. City of Seattle, 9 by contrast, the Washington Court of
Appeals took the opposite position. The court noted that,
because the trial court declined to certify the proposed class, the
defendant city's failure to appeal from a ruling on the merits in
favor of the individual plaintiff would result in a final judgment
beneficial only to the plaintiff.70 The court of appeals therefore
concluded that the suit should have been certified as a class
action to ensure that all members of the class would benefit by
the determination that the statute was facially
unconstitutional.71
The second problem concerns the extent to which damage
relief is available in a (b)(2) class action. A number of federal
of CR 23(b)(1)(B) would be met. Only one Washington appellate decision refers to CR
23(b)(1). Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 922, 930, 557 P.2d 1299, 1305 (1976). The
Johnson court declined to review the trial court's refusal to certify a (b)(1) class for
reasons having nothing to do with the propriety of bringing the action under CR
23(b)(1). Id. See infra note 71. In fact, the action should probably have been brought
under CR 23(b)(2). Although characterized as an action for habeas corpus relief, the
practical effect of the action was to enjoin the state from retroactively applying a statute
designed to expand juvenile court jurisdiction.
67. Dore, 79 Wash. 2d at 785, 489 P.2d at 915 (Stafford, J., dissenting). Some federal
cases have suggested that notice may, at times, be constitutionally required, even when
not mandated by rule 23. See, e.g., Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437
(5th Cir. 1979) (noting the due process requirement).
68. See, e.g., Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir.
1976), aff'd, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 571
(8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972). But see Vickers v. Trainor, 546 F.2d
739, 747 (7th Cir. 1976) (reversing district court denial of motion for class certification
when denial was based on fact that injunctive relief would "redound to the benefit of all
the persons the plaintiffs were seeking to represent").
69. 19 Wash. App. 864, 578 P.2d 548 (1978).
70. Id. at 870, 578 P.2d at 551-52.
71. Id. But in Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 922, 930, 557 P.2d 1299, 1305 (1976),
the Washington Supreme Court declined to overturn the trial court's denial of class cer-
tification because the supreme court assumed that defendant would abide by the trial
court's ruling on the merits as to putative class members.
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courts have taken the position that although rule 23(b)(2)
speaks to actions in which injunctive or declaratory relief is
appropriate, a (b)(2) action that includes a request for monetary
relief is not precluded unless it is the predominant form of relief
sought by the classs.7  The Washington Supreme Court in Han-
son v. Hutt73 agreed, permitting retroactive monetary relief in
the form of unemployment insurance benefits to be awarded to
the class in a (b)(2) class action in which the primary relief
sought was an injunction. 4 It is noteworthy that had Hanson
been brought in the federal courts,75 retroactive benefits, which
would be drawn from state coffers, would have been barred by
the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution."6
The Hanson" court also refused to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies by each individual class member when
the representative plaintiff had exhausted her remedies and the
defendant had misled absent class members as to steps neces-
sary to complete the agency claims process.7 7 This holding is not
as liberal as the position taken by the federal courts in Title VII
class litigation, although that position has been specially justi-
fied by the broad remedial purpose of Congress in enacting Title
VII.78
72. Dyer-Neely v. City of Chicago, 101 F.R.D. 83, 87 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Edmondson v.
Simon, 86 F.R.D. 375, 383 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Washington v. Walker, 75 F.R.D. 650, 654
(S.D. 111. 1977). The Advisory Committee notes on federal rule 23 support this position,
stating that subdivision (b)(2) "does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final
relief related exclusively or predominantly to money damages." FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advi-
sory committee note.
73. 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1973).
74. Id. at 204, 517 P.2d at 604-05. The result, although not explained by the court,
could be justified by the rationale utilized by federal courts in permitting equitable back-
pay awards in Title VII actions brought under federal rule 23(b)(2). See, e.g., Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1974) ("final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief" language of rule 23(b)(2) does not exclude monetary
relief), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). Rule 23(b)(2) does not require that only
injunctive or declaratory relief be sought, but simply that it be appropriate.
75. In Hanson, the plaintiffs challenged, on equal protection grounds, the termina-
tion of unemployment insurance benefits to pregnant women who qualified for benefits
before their pregnancy. 83 Wash. 2d at 197, 517 P.2d at 601. Thus, jurisdiction in the
federal courts clearly would have been available.
76. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1974) (federal courts are barred by
the 11th amendment from granting retroactive equitable relief that results in a liability
to be paid from public funds in the state treasury when the state has not waived its
sovereign immunity).
77. Hanson, 83 Wash. 2d at 202-03, 517 P.2d at 604.
78. Exhaustion of administrative remedies by absent class members is not required
in a Title VII action. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody; 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975). The same
position has not been adopted with regard to other federal statutory schemes under
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IV. CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE
CR 23(c)-(e) outline the procedure for handling class actions
at the trial court level. CR 23(c) focuses primarily on the certifi-
cation process and on the impact of class certification; 9 CR
23(d) focuses on the trial court's role in guiding the conduct of
class actions;80 and CR 23(e) is concerned with the problem of
which class-wide relief may be sought. See, e.g., Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d
609, 610-11 (5th Cir. 1977) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act class members must
file required notices with the Secretary of Labor and affirmatively opt in to the class).
79. WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 23(c) provides:
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as
a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so main-
tained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under paragraph (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the cir-
cumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if
he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under para-
graph (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment
in an action maintained as a class action under paragraph (b)(3), whether or
not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom
the notice provided in paragraph (c)(2) was directed, and who have not
requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate, (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule
shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
80. WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 23(d) provides:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make
appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing
measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the
class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in
such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step
in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity
of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and ade-
quate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into
the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on inter-
venors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom
allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed
accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be
combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may
be desirable from time to time.
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settling class actions.8'
A. CR 23(c)-Certification Procedure
CR 23(c) requires the trial court to make a formal determi-
nation at an early stage in the proceedings whether a class
action should be allowed. 2 As has been noted earlier, if the
action is "certified" under CR 23(b)(3), notice to the class and
an opportunity to "opt out" must be provided.83 Class actions
may be certified as to particular issues, or by subclasses, 4 and
the certification may be conditional, subject to later modification
or withdrawal.85 In any certified class action, the final judgment
must adequately describe the class for or against which the judg-
ment is being rendered.8 6
1. Early Class Determination
CR 23(c)(1) provides that "[a]s soon as practicable after the
commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court
shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.
8 7
On two different occasions, Washington appellate courts have
reminded trial judges of the importance of this requirement.
In Say v. Smith,"8 the trial court had dismissed an action,
filed as a class action, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
without ruling on the propriety of bringing the suit as a class
action.89 The court of appeals declined to address the class
action issue, but noted that if the case were remanded on the
jurisdiction question, a decision by the trial court on class certi-
fication should be made "'as soon as practicable.'"90
In Washington Education Association v. Shelton School
District No. 309,91 the supreme court discussed the importance
81. WASH. Sup. CT. Civ. R. 23(e) provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs."
82. WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 23(c)(1).
83. WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 23(c)(2).
84. WASH. SUP. CT. Civ. R. 23(c)(4).
85. WASH. SUP. CT. Civ. R. 23(c)(1).
86. WASH. SUP. CT. Civ. R. 23(c)(3).
87. WASH. SUP. CT. Civ. R. 23(c)(1).
88. 5 Wash. App. 677, 491 P.2d 687 (1971).
89. Id. at 680, 491 P.2d at 689-90.
90. Id. at 680, 491 P.2d at 690 (quoting WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 23(c)(1)).
91. 93 Wash. 2d 783, 613 P.2d 769 (1980).
1985] 573
574 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 8:557
of early class certification, holding that while class certification
"need not always be undertaken before other pretrial motions
are considered," it must be considered before any other matters
are decided that might adversely affect the question of class cer-
tification.2 Furthermore, the court noted that class certification
should not be influenced by the trial court's view of the merits
of plaintiffs' claim.9
However, despite these reminders that early determination
of the class certification question independent of the merits is
important, Washington trial courts seem to take a more lax view
of CR 23(c)(1), with the tacit approval of the appellate courts. In
Scannell v. City of Seattle,e4 the trial court expressly deferred, a
decision on plaintiff's motion for class certification pending its
decision on the question of defendant's liability. The trial court
then granted defendant's summary judgment motion and dis-
missed plaintiff's claims on the merits.9 The supreme court
reversed and remanded for a determination of the damages owed
to each named plaintiff without any further mention of the class
certification question. 6 On at least two other occasions, the
supreme court has observed, without additional comment or
criticism, that trial courts have deferred ruling on class certifica-
tion, granting summary judgment for defendant instead. 7 Fur-
92. Id. at 788, 613 P.2d at 773 (emphasis in original). This suit was brought as a
class action by a class of parents of school age daughters and women public school
coaches against a defendant class of local school districts. The trial court transferred
claims against certain defendants to their home counties on venue grounds. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court noted that these venue transfers could be justified only by assum-
ing the inappropriateness of certification of the proposed defendant class, an assumption
the trial court could not make without first considering the class certification question.
Id. at 788-89, 613 P.2d at 772-73.
93. Id. at 790, 613 P.2d at 773. This is consistent with the position generally taken
by the federal courts. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
94. 97 Wash. 2d 701, 648 P.2d 435 (1982).
95. Id. at 703, 648 P.2d at 437.
96. Id. at 706, 648 P.2d at 438. It is unclear from the supreme court's opinion
whether the plaintiffs raised the class certification question on appeal. If they did not,
that would explain the supreme court's failure to address the issue. The important point,
however, is that the ultimate impact of the trial court's deferral of class certification was
to deny class certification sub silentio without ever having considered its
appropriateness.
97. Arment v. Henry, 98 Wash. 2d 775, 777, 658 P.2d 663, 664 (1983); MacLean v.
First N.W. Indus. of Am., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 340, 635 P.2d 683, 684 (1981). In Dore v.
Kinnear, 79 Wash. 2d 755, 489 P.2d 898 (1979), the supreme court went a step further.
The trial court had deferred its certification ruling on certain issues in the case until
trial, but then never ruled on certification of those questions, finding instead in favor of
the defendant on the merits. Id. at 782, 489 P.2d at 913 (Stafford, J., dissenting). The
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thermore, in Emwright v. King County,98 the supreme court
reversed the grant of summary judgment for plaintiff and then
declined to rule on plaintiff's cross-appeal from the denial of
class certification on the ground that a decision on class certifi-
cation was no longer necessary."
For trial courts, the clear implication of these decisions is
that in cases in which a plaintiff's individual claim might be dis-
missed on the merits before trial, deferral of class certification
decisions until the merits are resolved is an appropriate way to
avoid needless procedural battles. This apparently common
practice of deferring class certification questions pending review
of the merits is certainly contrary to at least the recommended
federal practice. The Manual for Complex Litigation suggests
that summary judgment or other motions directed toward weed-
ing out unmeritorious claims should not be resolved before class
certification issues, except in the clearest cases when a claim is
"wholly lacking in merit."10
More significantly, the Washington practice of deferring
class certification questions creates several problems that under-
mine important policies behind CR 23. First, one of the primary
purposes of the class action device is the avoidance of multiplic-
ity of litigation."' If a class action is appropriate under CR 23(a)
and (b), and the court decides in favor of defendant on the mer-
its, CR 23(c) contemplates that a judgment for the defendant
should bind the whole class and prevent future litigation on the
same subject.102 The practice of granting summary judgment for
defendant before ruling on class certification defeats this impor-
tant objective.
Second, deferring class certification questions may hide seri-
ous adequacy of representation problems. When the plaintiffs
supreme court reversed on the merits and ordered class-wide relief, treating the case as if
it had been fully certified all along. Id. at 767, 489 P.2d at 905.
98. 96 Wash. 2d 538, 637 P.2d 656 (1981).
99. Id. at 545-46, 637 P.2d at 660.
100. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2.11, at 97 (5th ed. 1982).
101. Z. CHAFFEE, SOME PROBLEMS IN EQUITY 280 (1950). See also Brown v. Brown, 6
Wash. App. 249, 253, 492 P.2d 581, 586 (1971) (a primary function of the class suit is to
avoid multiplicity of litigation).
102. WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 23(c)(3) requires that the judgment in any class action,
"whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court
finds to be members of the class." Furthermore, the Advisory Committee's notes follow-
ing the identical federal rule state specifically that "Itihe judgment in a class action
maintained as such to the end will embrace the class ...whether it is favorable or
unfavorable to the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee note.
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claims appear weak on the merits, the plaintiff may seem to be
an inadequate representative of the class whose claims he seeks
to raise. Thus, a dismissal of the named plaintiff's claim, without
addressing the class' claims, may seem like a more equitable
solution to the class action problem. The adverse determination
of plaintiff's claim, however, can still have a precedential effect
on the class' claims, even though those claims may never have
been adequately presented. 10 3 A better solution to this concern
would be to determine class certification directly, early in the
litigation. If the plaintiff cannot adequately represent the class,
the court should so find. If the plaintiff can adequately represent
the class, and the other requirements of class certification are
met, the court should certify the class. Then, if the claims later
prove to be without merit, the court should enter a judgment for
the defendant that fully binds the class.
2. Necessity of Moving for Class Certification
Some federal courts have taken the position that determina-
tion of whether class certification is proper should be made sua
sponte if the class representative does not move for certifica-
tion.' 0" The Manual for Complex Litigation suggests that judges
should affirmatively raise the question of whether class certifica-
tion will be sought, so that the class action issues can be
promptly determined.' 0 5 While the Washington experience on
this point is limited, at least one trial court, with tacit approval
from the state's supreme court, took a contrary position, dis-
missing a class action without prejudice because of plaintiff's
failure to seek certification pursuant to CR 23(c)(1).'0°
Normally, when a party seeks certification of a class action,
103. For example, in both Arment v. Henry, 98 Wash. 2d 775, 658 P.2d 663 (1978),
and MacLean v. First N.W. Indus. of Am., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981), the end
result of the litigation was a judgment by the supreme court on questions of law that, as
a practical matter, would foreclose future litigation on the same subject by other mem-
bers of the proposed classes. However, because the class certification question was
deferred and ultimately ignored, no court ever made a determination that the named
plaintiffs or their attorneys adequately represented the class on the litigated issues.
104. See, e.g., White v. Local 942, Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 90 F.R.D. 368,
371 (D. Alaska 1981) (question of certification is always susceptible to sua sponte ruling
by court), aff'd in part by mem., 688 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1982); Boring v. Medusa Port-
land Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78, 80 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (rule 23(c)(1) does not require plain-
tiff to seek certification: court may act sua sponte or defendant may move to have court
rule action not maintainable as class action).
105. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.40, at 21 (5th ed. 1982).
106. Oliver v. Harborview Medical Center, 94 Wash. 2d 559, 618 P.2d 76 (1980).
[Vol. 8:557
Class Actions- Washington Style
it will be the plaintiff seeking to certify a plaintiff class. 107 Occa-
sionally, however, a defendant not wanting to defend a multi-
tude of claims may seek class certification of an action brought
by an individual plaintiff. In Murphy v. Huntington,0 8 this
occurred in an unusual procedural posture. Several individual
plaintiff property owners brought an action to enjoin county offi-
cials from proceeding with certain public improvements. The
defendant county and county officials defended on statute of
limitations grounds and impleaded as third-party defendants a
class composed of certain organizations and individuals opposed
to the public improvement challenged by the plaintiffs. 09 The
defendants' purpose, in other words, was to ensure that all per-
sons and groups opposed to the public improvements, not just
the original named plaintiffs, were parties to the lawsuit.
The use of third-party practice to achieve the defendants'
objectives was peculiar since the third-party defendants hardly
fit the classic mold of impleaded parties.110 However, the end
result was essentially the same as though defendants had moved
for certification of a plaintiff class to be represented by the
named plaintiffs and any other appropriate class members. The
claims of original plaintiffs and the "claims" of the third-party
defendant class were held time-barred.1 Thus the defendants
achieved their objective of extinguishing all potential claims of
any class members in one lawsuit.
3. Partial or Provisional Certification
The Washington appellate courts have consistently empha-
107. Although CR 23 contemplates the possibility of both plaintiff and defendant
class actions, the overwhelming number of class actions are brought on behalf of plaintiff
classes rather than against defendant classes. Furthermore, defendants generally oppose
certification of plaintiff classes on the theory that certification makes defense of the liti-
gation more complex and potential liability more onerous. A defendant who wins a plain-
tiff class suit, however, may benefit in the long run by having more effectively foreclosed
future litigation on the subject.
108. 91 Wash. 2d 265, 588 P.2d 742 (1978).
109. Id. at 266-67, 588 P.2d at 744.
110. The impleading of third parties into a lawsuit has generally been limited to
circumstances in which the defendant seeks indemnity, contribution, or subrogation
from the third party. C. WRIGHT, LAW ov FEDERAL COURTS 510 (4th ed. 1983). The third-
party claim in Murphy did not fit into any of these categories. The defendants were
essentially seeking a declaratory judgment against the third-party class that any claims
the class might have against defendant were time-barred along with the plaintiffs'
claims.
111. Murphy, 91 Wash. 2d at 266-67, 588 P.2d at 744.
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sized the need for flexibility in class certification proceedings
and the power of the trial judge to mold class action orders to
meet the needs of individual cases. For example, a class action
that seems inappropriate because of differing factual or legal
questions among the class members may be resurrected under
CR 23(c)(4)(B) by dividing it into appropriate subclasses along
the lines of the differing questions presented by each sub-
group.112 Furthermore, a class action that seems appropriate for
certification on some issues, but not on others, may be certified
"with respect to particular issues" under CR 23(c)(4)(A). 11s By
subclass or issue certification, the sometimes conflicting concerns
of fairness to the litigants and efficiency can be more easily
accommodated. 11
4
Finally, as the Washington appellate courts have occasion-
ally noted in passing, should it later become apparent that a
case certified as a class action is not appropriate for class action
treatment, the certification order may be altered or amended
under CR 23(c)(1). 1 5 Greater emphasis on the modifiability and
conditional nature of class action orders by the appellate courts
could result in less frequent reliance by trial courts on the prac-
tice of deferring class certification decisions until after determi-
nations on the merits have been made. This, in turn, would help
avoid some of the multiplicity of litigation and representation
problems that are caused by delayed certification.1 '
4. Effect of Failure to Certify Class
On at least two occasions, the Washington appellate courts
112. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 680, 688, 586
P.2d 830, 834 (1978) (when certified class is not drawn to precision, this flaw is not fatal
to class action; instead the court can divide the class into subclasses for treatment of
particular issues); Brown v. Brown, 6 Wash. App. 249, 256, 492 P.2d 581, 585 (1971)
(appropriate to divide class into subclasses rather than to deny the class action
altogether).
113. See, e.g., Panorama Residential Protective Ass'n v. Panorama Corp., 28 Wash.
App. 923, 934-35, 627 P.2d 121, 129 (1981) (decertifying a class as to a particular issue
that was not appropriate for class litigation), modified, 97 Wash. 2d 23, 640 P.2d 1057
(1982); WASH. SUP. CT. Civ. R. 23(c)(4)(A).
114. For some suggestions on how rule 23(c)(4) can be used to assist in the handling
of complex mass tort litigation, see Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions, 98 F.R.D. 323
(1983).
115. Panorama Residential Protective Ass'n v. Panorama Corp., 28 Wash. App. 923,
934-35, 627 P.2d 121, 129 (1981), modified, 97 Wash. 2d 23, 640 P.2d 1057 (1982); Brown
v. Brown, 6 Wash. App. 249, 256, 492 P.2d 581, 585-86 (1971) (quoting Esplin v. Hirschi,
402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968)).
116. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
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have rejected efforts to give class action effect to cases never cer-
tified as such. In State Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter
Construction Co.,"17 the plaintiffs neither attempted to meet the
requirements of CR 23(a) and (b) nor moved for formal certifica-
tion. The plaintiffs asserted that neither was necessary in an
action brought under the Shoreline Management Act," 8 which
provided that "[p]rivate persons shall have the right to bring
suit . . . on their own behalf and on behalf of all persons simi-
larly situated.""' 9 The supreme court disagreed, holding that
because plaintiffs had never sought formal certification of a class
or otherwise established that they met the requirement of CR
23, the judgment awarding damages against defendant was cor-
rectly limited to the named plaintiffs.'2
0
In Fairwood Greens Homeowners Association v. Young,''
the plaintiff asserted that defendants were bound by a judgment
in a prior action to which they were not formal parties. Those
defendants were aware of the prior case and of efforts to certify
it as a class action, as the defendants had expressly opposed
class certification during proceedings in that case.'12 The court
of appeals in Fairwood Greens held that since the provisions of
CR 23 had never been followed in the prior case, it was not a
class action and could not bind the present defendants. A class
had never been formally certified as required by CR 23(c)(1). No
orders were ever entered to ensure protection of the interests of
absent class members, and the judgment entered in the prior
case made no reference to any class as it should have under CR
23(c)(3). 123
On other occasions, however, the Washington courts have
permitted cases to be treated as class actions on the basis of less
than the full compliance with the certification requirement of
CR 23(c). In Dore v. Kinnear,2 4 for example, the trial court
deferred class certification on certain issues until trial, but never
ruled on the certification question during or after trial. The
supreme court, nevertheless, in reversing the trial court on the
117. 89 Wash. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977).
118. Id. at 214, 571 P.2d at 202.
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.230 (1983).
120. Pacesetter, 89 Wash. 2d at 215, 571 P.2d at 202-03.
121. 26 Wash. App. 758, 614 P.2d 219 (1980).
122. Id. at 763-64, 614 P.2d at 223.
123. Id.
124. 79 Wash. 2d 755, 489 P.2d 898 (1971).
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merits, ordered class-wide relief because it concluded that the
case was a classic (b)(2) class action. 12 5 In Darrin v. Gould,2 ' the
supreme court criticized the trial court's failure to comply with
the requirements of CR 23(c) but, nevertheless, accepted the
trial court's after-the-fact treatment of the case as a class action
in its final judgment, noting only that the class should have been
defined with more precision.1
2 7
The message that the supreme court is sending by these
seemingly conflicting decisions is unclear. In Darrin and Dore,
however, the relief sought on behalf of the class was injunctive
only."' The litigation posture of the defendants in those cases
would not have changed significantly had they been made aware,
in advance, that the cases would be treated as class actions.'2" In
Fairwood Greens, by contrast, the persons affected by the ques-
tion of whether the original litigation should be treated as a
class action, after the fact, were not even parties to that litiga-
tion. 13 Consequently, binding those persons to the judgment by
after-the-fact certification would be unfair. In Pacesetter, the
plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of a class for which they had
never sought certification.' 31 Upholding the request would have
been unfair since it would impose upon the defendant a liability
he did not know he was contesting. Perhaps the court is saying
in these cases, "When the failure to address certification
125. Id. at 766, 489 P.2d at 904-05. The majority asserted that the case had been
certified as a class action by the trial court. Id. However, as Justice Stafford's dissent
made perfectly clear, the trial court's original conditional certification order was with-
drawn as to all but one issue in the case, and certification as to the remaining issues was
deferred until trial and then never taken up again. Id. at 782, 489 P.2d at 913 (Stafford,
J., dissenting).
126. 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
127. Id. at 862-63, 540 P.2d at 885. The supreme court did not make clear the pre-
cise manner of noncompliance with CR 23(c), except to say that "there had been no
compliance" with those provisions. Id. at 863, 540 P.2d at 885. The only corrective mea-
sure taken by the court, however, was to narrow the class definition from all high school
girls who desired to play football to all otherwise qualified high school girls who desired
to play football. Id.
128. Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 862, 540 P.2d at 884; Dore, 79 Wash. 2d at 756, 489
P.2d at 899.
129. The defendants in Darrin and Dore were clearly aware that their cases might
be treated as class actions because the suits were pleaded as class actions. Darrin, 85
Wash. 2d at 862, 540 P.2d at 884; Dore, 79 Wash. 2d at 756, 489 P.2d at 899. Further-
more, the trial court in Dore explicitly deferred class certification until trial, thus leaving
open the possibility that even at that late date the case could be converted to a class
action. Dore, 79 Wash. 2d at 782, 489 P.2d at 913 (Stafford, J., dissenting).
130. Fairwood Greens, 26 Wash. App. at 764, 614 P.2d at 223.
131. Pacesetter, 89 Wash. 2d at 214, 571 P.2d at 202.
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problems at the right time can be fixed without substantial
prejudice to anyone, we will do so, but when prejudice cannot
otherwise be avoided, we will refuse to treat the case as a class
action."
B. CR 23(d)-Supervisory Powers of the Trial Court
In a class action suit, the trial court has broad supervisory
powers granted by CR 23(d) that are designed to help streamline
what might otherwise be complex and prolonged proceedings
and to protect the rights of absent class members. 2 The only
Washington appellate court decisions that have examined
closely the use of these supervisory powers by the trial court are
Johnston v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America 33  and
Darling v. Champion Home Builders Co.,"a4 both of which
involved the troublesome issue of attorney communication with
absent class members.
In Johnston, the trial court entered an order severely limit-
ing communications by the parties or their counsel with absent
class members.' 5 This order followed closely a Sample Pretrial
132. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.43, at 33 (5th ed. 1982).
133. 96 Wash. 2d 708, 638 P.2d 1201 (1982).
134. 96 Wash. 2d 701, 638 P.2d 1249 (1982).
135. Johnston, 96 Wash. 2d at 710, 638 P.2d at 1202. The pertinent provisions of
the order were as follows:
All parties hereto and their counsel are hereby forbidden, directly or indi-
rectly, orally or in writing, to communicate concerning such action with any
potential or actual class member not a formal party to the action without the
consent of and approval of the communication by order of the Court. Any such
proposed communication shall be presented to the Court in writing with a des-
ignation of or description of all addressees and with a motion and proposed
order for prior approval by the Court of the proposed communication and pro-
posed addressees. The communications forbidden by this rule include, but are
not limited to, (a) solicitation, directly or indirectly, of legal representation of
potential and actual class members who are not formal parties to the class
action; (b) solicitation of fees and expenses and agreements to pay fees and
expenses, from potential and actual class members who are not formal parties
to the class action; (c) solicitation by formal parties to the class action of
requests by class members to opt out in class actions under sub-paragraph
(b)(3) of CR 23; and (d) communications from counsel or a party which may
tend to misrepresent the status, purposes, and effects of the action, and of
actual or potential court orders therein, which may create impressions tending,
without cause, to reflect adversely on any party, any counsel, the Court, or the
administration of justice. The obligations and prohibitions of this rule are not
exclusive. All other ethical, legal, and equitable obligations are unaffected by
this rule.
This order does not forbid (1) communications between an attorney and
his client or a prospective client who has, on the initiative of the client or
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Order suggested for prevention of potential abuse in federal
class actions by the 1977 edition of the Manual for Complex
Litigation."6 A dispute arose concerning the no-communication
order when, after the case was partially settled, plaintiff's attor-
ney wrote a letter to class members reminding them of the pro-
cedure and deadline for filing claims.' Because the letter was
sent without the approval of the court, as required by the no-
communication order, defendants objected to the letter and
plaintiff's attorney was found in contempt of court.'38 The attor-
ney appealed, asserting first that the letter did not fall within
the prohibition of the no-communication order and second that
if it did, the order violated the attorney's first amendment
rights.1 3e The court of appeals affirmed, holding that counsel had
clearly violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the order by his
unapproved class communication. The court of appeals found
that the need to preserve an atmosphere conducive to a fair trial
by limiting communication with the class outweighed whatever
first amendment interests of the attorney might be affected by
prospective client, consulted with, employed, or proposed to employ the attor-
ney; or (2) communications occurring in the regular course of business or office
which do not have the effect of soliciting representation by counsel or misrep-
resenting the status, purposes, or effect of the action and orders therein.
When appropriate, the Court may approve the substance of permitted
communications and general descriptions of the circumstances under which the
communication is approved, and general descriptions of the parties to whom it
may be sent, and the parties who may send the communication.
96 Wash. 2d at 711, 638 P.2d at 1202.
136. The 1977 edition of the Manual discussed many of the potential abuses con-
nected with class action litigation. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.41 (4th ed.
1977). This earlier edition recommended that trial courts use a pretrial order almost
identical to the order entered in Johnston, save for the following paragraph, not included
in the Johnston order:
If any party or counsel for a party asserts a constitutional right to commu-
nicate with any member of the class without prior restraint and does so com-
municate pursuant to that asserted right, he shall within five days after such
communication file with the Court a copy of such communication, if in writing,
or an accurate and substantially complete summary of the communication if
oral.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.41 app., at 188-89 (4th ed. 1977).
137. 96 Wash. 2d at 711, 638 P.2d at 1202-03. Under the settlement agreement,
defendants were permitted to seek reimbursement from the settlement fund of any
amount left over after the payment of all reasonable claims. Plaintiff's attorney wrote
the challenged letter to the class about two weeks before the deadline for filing claims,
and one month after the official notice to the class concerning settlement procedure had
been sent with court approval. Id.
138. Id. at 712, 638 P.2d at 1203.
139. Id. at 709, 638 P.2d at 1202.
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the court's order.1 40
The Washington Supreme Court reversed, without reaching
the constitutional question, holding that in light of the purpose
of the no-communication order, the letter in question could not
be found to violate the order."" The purpose for limiting com-
munication with the class, the court stated, was to avoid abuses
such as fomenting litigation, soliciting funds to support an
action, and exercising undue influence over or misrepresenting
facts to the class.1 2 The supreme court found that the letter was
not contemptuous because a settlement and notice to the class
about the settlement had already been approved by the court,
because the challenged letter was designed only to remind class
members of the deadline on claims contained in the notice they
had already received and of the necessity for filing claims, and
because the challenged letter generated legitimate claims in fur-
therance of the aims of the court-approved settlement.
1 4 3
In Darling, the trial court entered an order limiting commu-
nication with the class that was virtually identical to the John-
ston order14 4 The dispute over the no-communication order
arose when the order was amended at defendant's request. The
amended order added an expert associated with the plaintiffs to
the group of persons barred from communicating with the class.
The plaintiffs petitioned the supreme court for direct review of
the amended order, asserting that the order was an abuse of the
trial court's power under CR 23(d) and a violation of the first
amendment.'4 5 Between the entry of the trial court's amended
order and the Washington Supreme Court's decision on appeal,
the United States Supreme Court decided Gulf Oil Co. v. Ber-
nard,"" which raised similar questions concerning the no-com-
munication order recommended by the Manual for Complex
140. Johnston v. Beneficial Management Corp. of Am., 26 Wash. App. 671, 677, 614
P.2d 661, 664-65 (1980), rev'd, 96 Wash. 2d 708, 638 P.2d 1201 (1982).
141. Johnston, 96 Wash. 2d at 714-15, 638 P.2d at 1204.
142. Id. at 713, 638 P.2d at 1203.
143. Id. at 714-15, 638 P.2d at 1204.
144. Darling, 96 Wash. 2d at 704-05, 638 P.2d at 1250-51. The order in Darling was
based on KING COUNTY SuP. CT. LOCAL R. 23(f), which was adopted after the trial court
in Johnston issued its order.
145. 96 Wash. 2d at 702-03, 638 P.2d at 1250.
146. 452 U.S. 89 (1981). The trial court's amended order in Darling was entered on
May 28, 1981. 96 Wash. 2d at 704, 638 P.2d at 1250. Gulf Oil was decided on June 1,
1981. 452 U.S. at 89. The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Darling was handed
down on January 14, 1982. 96 Wash. 2d at 701, 638 P.2d at 1249.
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Litigation.1 47
In Gulf Oil, the plaintiffs had brought an employment dis-
crimination class action in federal court at the same time that
the defendant in that action, Gulf Oil, was trying to convince
employees to accept a settlement offered by the company
through the auspices of the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission. 4 ' Because of the no-communication order, plain-
tiffs and their counsel were precluded from advising members of
the proposed class to seek legal advice before accepting Gulf's
settlement offer.149 The United States Supreme Court declined
to reach the first amendment questions raised by plaintiffs
because the Court concluded, on the facts before it, that the trial
court clearly abused its supervisory power under federal rule
23(d) by entering the no-communication order. 50 For the future,
the Court suggested that communication bans should not be
imposed without an initial determination, on a clear and com-
plete record, with specific findings in support of the determina-
tion, that the need to restrict communication with the class out-
weighs the potential interferences with the rights of the parties
that might flow from the restriction.'5 '
The circumstances before the Washington Supreme Court
in Darling were not nearly as dramatic as those present in Gulf
Oil. The Darling case was still in the earliest stages of litiga-
tion, 52 and no settlement was imminent. 53 The Washington
147. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.41 app., at 188-89 (4th ed. 1977). See
supra note 136.
148. Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 91-92.
149. Id. at 94-95. However, communication by Gulf to the class members of its set-
tlement offer was excluded from the communication ban. Id. at 95.
150. Id. at 103-04.
151. Id. at 101-04. After Gulf Oil was decided, the authors of the Manual for Com-
plex Litigation withdrew their earlier recommendation that no-communication orders be
entered as a matter of course in class actions and substituted recommendations along the
lines of the position taken by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil. Compare MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.41, at 27 (4th ed. 1977) ("In order to guard against unapproved
[solicitation], it is recommended that each court adopt a local rule forbidding unap-
proved direct or indirect written and oral communications by formal parties or their
counsel with potential and actual class members who are not formal parties .... ") with
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.41, at 28 (5th ed. 1982) ("All local rules providing
for automatic judicial control of communications with action and potential class mem-
bers should be revoked.").
152. Indeed, the no-communication order was entered before the class was even cer-
tified. Darling, 96 Wash. 2d at 702, 638 P.2d at 1250.
153. Thus, in contrast to Johnston and Gulf Oil, in Darling there was no specific
need for immediate communication with the class.
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Supreme Court, while declining to find a specific abuse of power
as the United States Supreme Court had found in Gulf Oil, nev-
ertheless decided that any communication bans in class actions,
because they could create potential difficulties for the parties or
their lawyers, should be entered only after the trial court makes
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the
need for a communication ban. Therefore, the Washington
Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for recon-
sideration of the communication ban in light of the need for spe-
cific findings to support it.154 Because of its holding, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, like the United States Supreme Court in
Gulf Oil, was able to avoid the first amendment issues raised by
the petitioner.'55
One point in particular should be noted about the Darling
case. The Darling court took great pains to say that it was not
going as far as the United States Supreme Court did in Gulf Oil
because Darling, unlike Gulf Oil, did not determine that the
communication ban in question was unreasonable. 156 In fact, the
practical impact of Darling is the same. Both Darling and Gulf
Oil require findings on the record, before the ban can be
entered, that the dangers of abuse of the class action device jus-
tify the potential interference with the rights of the parties that
a communication ban may cause.
C. CR 23(e)-Class Action Settlements
While countless federal decisions have been handed down
by both trial and appellate courts on the special problem of set-
tling class action litigation, 157 the Washington appellate courts
have not yet heard an appeal raising settlement issues.' 58 The
brevity of CR 23(e) is probably one reason for the lack of Wash-
ington precedent on the question of class action settlements. CR
23(e) is short and to the point, stating simply that "[a] class
154. 96 Wash. 2d at 708, 638 P.2d at 1252.
155. Id. at 703 n.1, 638 P.2d at 1250 n.1.
156. Id. at 706, 638 P.2d at 1251-52.
157. See, e.g., cases cited in SECTION OF LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, DYNAMICS
AND PROCEDURES IN THE SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTIONS (1983).
158. Johnston v. Beneficial Management Corp. of Am., 96 Wash. 2d 708, 638 P.2d
1201 (1982), discussed supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text, in the context of the
supervisory powers of the trial court, was a settled class action. The appeal in Johnston,
however, did not raise any questions about the settlement itself. The appeal was from an
order holding plaintiff's attorney in contempt of court for violating a prior order banning
unauthorized communication with the class. 96 Wash. 2d at 709, 638 P.2d at 1201-02.
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action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court dictates."''8 9 There just isn't much in the
rule to fight about. The rule requires court approval of both set-
tlements and notices to the class of the proposed settlement. It
doesn't take a Sherlock Holmes to figure out that "notice of the
proposed .. .compromise" ' 0 means notice before the compro-
mise is approved. Furthermore, if flagrant abuse of class action
procedure is to be avoided, the notice itself ought to be
approved by the court before it is sent. 16l Finally, for the notice
to have any meaning at all, it must be followed by an opportu-
nity for class members to present their objections to the pro-
posed settlement.
6 2
It is not surprising, therefore, that there is almost universal
agreement in the federal courts on a four-step procedure for
reviewing proposed class action settlements. Initially, the court
reviews the settlement proposed by the parties (including the
proposed notice to be sent to the class) and decides whether to
give tentative approval to the settlement.113 If the court tenta-
tively approves the settlement and the proposed notice, the
notice is sent to the class members, explaining the terms of the
settlement and telling them when, where, and how they can
object.16 4 A final hearing on the proposed settlement is then
159. WASH. SUP. CT. Civ. R. 23(e).
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. When settlement of a class action is proposed, the potential for conflicts among
counsel, the named plaintiffs, and class members is heightened. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d
655, 665 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982). Because of those potential
conflicts, it becomes particularly important that any notice to the class of a proposed
settlement be scrutinized carefully to ensure that it fairly and adequately describes the
settlement. Id.
162. There is not much point, after all, in being notified of the proposed settlement
before its final approval if there is no opportunity to object to the settlement's terms.
163. See, e.g., Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 79 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (a
court should make a tentative determination that the proposed compromise and dismis-
sal is reasonable before sending notice to the class and holding a full hearing); Mungin v.
Florida E. Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720, 732 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (it was not necessary to give
individual class members notice of a hearing concerned only with preliminary approval
of a proposed settlement), aff'd, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897
(1971). See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46, at 52 (5th ed. 1982).
164. See, e.g., Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Air-
lines, 455 F.2d 101, 108 (7th Cir. 1972) (notice fairly apprised class members of a pro-
posed compromise and of options open to dissenting class members when the notice
summarized proceedings to date, informed class members of the significance of judicial
approval of the proposed agreement, told class members that the agreement provided for
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held, at which all objections that have been properly raised are
presented. 165 The last step is final approval or disapproval of the
settlement. 6  The Washington appellate courts would undoubt-
edly adopt a similar review process if questions concerning set-
tlement procedures were raised.
The class action settlement questions causing the most con-
troversy in the federal courts deal with the settlement of cases
that have not yet been certified as class actions ' and the inclu-
sion of attorneys' fees as part of a settlement package.' 8 Both of
these problems pose a real dilemma because they force courts to
choose between the desirability of encouraging settlements and
the undesirability of permitting potential conflicts of interest to
influence the settlement process. For example, when attorneys'
fees become part of the settlement package, the attorney whose
fees are being settled must balance his or her interests against
those of the client in assessing the value of the proposed settle-
ment, which raises an obvious ethical dilemma.' 9 Excluding
attorneys' fees from the settlement process, however, as some
federal courts have done,'17 reduces the likelihood of settlement
because it prevents the defending party from achieving a settle-
their placement on a "preferential hiring list" subject to their acceptance, and informed
would-be dissenters that they might appear in person or by counsel to register their
objections and present evidence in support thereof); Milstein v. Werner, 57 F.R.D. 515,
518 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (in a shareholder's derivative suit, ample notice was provided by an
eight-page printed brochure, sent 38 days in advance of the hearing, that identified the
actions being terminated, detailed the course of the litigations, and adequately and rea-
sonably presented the terms of the settlement). See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §
1.46, at 52 (5th ed. 1982).
165. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 833 (3d Cir. 1973) (it is
"elemental" that an objector at a hearing on a proposed settlement is entitled to an
opportunity to develop a record in support of his contentions by means of cross-exami-
nation and argument to the court).
166. See, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 1975) (decision whether to
give final approval to a proposed settlement of a class action should not be made until
the class members are given adequate opportunity to object to the proposal).
167. Precertification settlements may involve all or part of the class on whose behalf
suit was brought. See, e.g., Meat Price Investigators Ass'n v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.,
607 F.2d 167, 173, 180 (5th Cir. 1979) (permitting temporary and permanent settlement
classes), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981). Or such settlements may involve only the
named plaintiffs. See, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1301 (4th Cir. 1978)
(class representatives settled their individual claims before class was certified; trial court
should have considered putative class members' interests).
168. See, e.g., Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648, 651-52 (9th Cir. 1984) (in the absence
of unusual circumstances, attorneys' fees should not be included as part of the settle-
ment of the claims of the class).
169. Id. at 652.
170. Id. at 651-52.
1985]
588 University of Puget Sound Law Review
ment that fully defines the extent of its liability. 7'
Precertification settlements raise a host of problems that
are well beyond the scope of this Article. The Manual for Com-
plex Litigation discourages them because of the high potential
for unfairness to the putative class.'72 Yet, the majority of fed-
eral courts have approved precertification settlements when fair-
ness could be demonstrated. 173 Obviously, the problem of precer-
tification settlement is far less likely to arise if careful attention
is paid to the requirement of early class certification. 74 This is
another reason why the Washington practice of deferring class
certification decisions beyond the early pretrial stages should be
discouraged. 75
V. MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
Four other class action or class action related problems have
received at least some attention by the Washington courts. Only
one of these problems, the availability of the class action device
for use against a defendant class, raises questions concerning
interpretation of the class action rule. The other three problems
are not unique to class actions and do not directly involve the
class action rule, but, nevertheless, raise special concerns in the
context of class actions. These three problems are the appeala-
bility of non-final orders, mootness, and attorneys' fees.
171. In cases in which attorneys' fees come out of the class recovery fund, defen-
dant's incentive to settle may not be affected by leaving the question of attorneys' fees
open. However, when attorneys' fees are to be paid by defendant, over and above any
contribution to a settlement fund, as is the practice in many federal civil rights actions,
the defendant will have far less incentive to settle the class claims if the question of
attorneys' fees must be left open. Furthermore, in either case, class members may have a
more difficult time judging the adequacy of the settlement proposal if the question of
attorneys' fees remains unresolved.
172. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46, at 60-61 (5th ed. 1982).
173. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1982) (whether a
proposed precertification settlement is fair is determined by "compar[ing] the terms of
the compromise with the likely rewards of litigation" and by examining the negotiation
process), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 77 (1983); Meat Price Investigators Ass'n v. Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc., 607 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Temporary settlements are favored
when there is little or no likelihood of abuse, and the settlement is fair and reasonable
.... "), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d
448, 465 (2d Cir. 1974) (precertification settlement posed less danger of unfairness when
negotiated after almost four years of litigation and when all class representatives were
represented by the same counsel).
174. WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 23(c)(1) requires that the determination whether to pro-
ceed with a class action be made "[als soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action."
175. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
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A. Defendant Class Actions
Defendant class actions are rare, but troublesome. Although
CR 23 contemplates the availability of defendant class actions,
providing, for example, in CR 23(a) that "[o]ne or more mem-
bers of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties[,]"' 7 a
the rule was clearly written with the more common plaintiff
class action primarily in mind. Thus, for example, the rule per-
mits members of a (b)(3) class action to opt out of the action,
with no apparent regard for the fact that the availability to
defendant class members of this option makes a (b)(3) defen-
dant class action virtually unworkable.'
Four cases in which defendant class actions have been
pleaded have reached the Washington appellate courts. In two of
these four cases, the defendant class was certified below. In
Marquardt v. Fein,178 the receiver of an insurance company
mortgagee brought a mortgage foreclosure proceeding against a
defendant class of some 800 mortgagors. 79 The propriety of the
trial court's certification of the defendant class was not, how-
ever, an issue on appeal. The appeal was concerned only with
the propriety of the trial court's removal of counsel for the
defendant class on the ground of inadequate representation.180
Murphy v. Huntington,' although characterized and certified
by the court as a class action by a defendant against an
impleaded class of third-party defendants,182 was in reality a
plaintiff class action, certified at the request of defendant.
8 3
The supreme court in Murphy did not address the class action
status of the case. 1
84
In one of the remaining two cases, Gellantly v. Chelan
176. WASH. SUP. CT. Civ. R. 23(a) (emphasis added).
177. Rare will be the defendant class member who, when given a choice in the mat-
ter, does not opt out. Even if every defendant class member does not opt out, the odds
are substantial that enough would opt out to negate a finding of numerosity under CR
23(a)(1). An additional problem with defendant class actions is that the defendant
becomes an involuntary representative party and is, therefore, more likely to have ade-
quacy of representation problems under CR 23(a)(4).
178. 25 Wash. App. 651, 612 P.2d 378 (1980).
179. Id. at 651, 612 P.2d at 378.
180. Id. at 652, 612 P.2d at 379.
181. 91 Wash. 2d 265, 588 P.2d 742 (1978).
182. Id. at 266, 588 P.2d at 744.
183. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
184. The appeal in Murphy was directed only to the correctness of the trial court's
ruling on the merits. 91 Wash. 2d at 267, 588 P.2d at 744.
5891985]
590 University of Puget Sound Law Review
County,1" the action was brought as a plaintiff and defendant
class action by a class of all real property taxpayers in Washing-
ton against a class of all the counties and appropriate county
officials in the State of Washington. 18 However, it is unclear
whether the trial court ever ruled on class certification. The
supreme court did no more than describe without comment the
nature of the classes that the plaintiffs sought to represent and
sue before going on to affirm the trial court's dismissal of the
action on the merits. 1
87
The only case in which the Washington appellate courts
have actually discussed the question of certifying a defendant
class action is Washington Education Association v. Shelton
School District No. 309.88 Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of a
class of all parents of school-age daughters in Washington and
all female Washington public school coaches. They sued a defen-
dant class of all Washington local school districts and alleged
sex discrimination in athletic programs.8 " The trial court denied
certification of both a plaintiff and a defendant class, and the
supreme court reversed and remanded for further consideration
of the class certification questions.' 90 The major stumbling
blocks to certification of the defendant class were the trial
court's determinations, first, that the named plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue local school districts with whom they had no
direct dealings and, second, that venue was inappropriate as to
defendants outside the forum county.' 9 ' At least one federal
court had taken a position similar to the trial court on the
standing question.'92 The supreme court in Washington Educa-
tion Association avoided the standing problem, however, by
holding that the allegations of a conspiracy among the defen-
dant class members gave the individual plaintiffs standing to sue
all members of the defendant class and that in any event the
associational plaintiff, whose members came from every school
district in the state, had standing to sue the entire defendant
185. 85 Wash. 2d 314, 534 P.2d 1027 (1975).
186. Id. at 315, 534 P.2d at 1028.
187. The supreme court did not indicate in its opinion whether certification was
granted or deferred. Id. at 314, 534 P.2d at 1028.
188. 93 Wash. 2d 783, 613 P.2d 769 (1980).
189. Id. at 783, 613 P.2d at 769.
190. Id. at 785, 613 P.2d at 771.
191. Id. at 790-91, 613 P.2d at 774-75.
192. La Mar v. H & B Novelty Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 464 (9th Cir. 1973) (no
standing to bring a class action against defendants with whom plaintiffs had no dealing).
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class.193 The supreme court further held that the venue question
should not have been considered until after the class certifica-
tion question had been resolved. The court, therefore, remanded
the case for reconsideration of class certification.
94
Although the supreme court in Washington Education
Association declined to express its views on the propriety of
class certification, it left little doubt that certification of a plain-
tiff and a defendant class action would be appropriate. 195 In
light of the allegations of sex discrimination in salaries, working
conditions, and facilities, and the obvious appropriateness of
declaratory or injunctive relief if those allegations proved accu-
rate, a (b)(2) class action would have been entirely proper.1 96
Some federal courts have held, however, that defendant class
actions are not permitted under the literal wording of federal
rule 23(b)(2), because a finding would be required that the
plaintiff's actions or inactions made injunctive relief against the
defendant class appropriate. 197 It does not appear that the
Washington Supreme Court is prepared to give CR 23(b)(2) so
narrow a reading.'98
193. 93 Wash. 2d at 790-91, 613 P.2d at 773-74. This position is not necessarily
inconsistent with La Mar v. H & B Novelty Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1973),
which suggested in dictum that the presence of a conspiracy among the defendant class
members would change the nature of the standing inquiry.
194. 93 Wash. 2d at 791, 613 P.2d at 774.
195. The supreme court said that it was not expressing any opinion on the appropri-
ateness of class certification, but at the same time it chided the trial court for basing its
decision not to certify a class on only one of the alternative requirements of CR 23(b)
without having considered the other three alternatives under CR 23(b) or the "minimal"
prerequisites of CR 23(a). Id. at 793, 613 P.2d at 775.
196. CR 23(b)(2) permits a class action when "the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief . WAsH. SuP.
CT. Civ. R. 23(b)(2).
197. See, e.g., Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1980) (suit brought
on behalf of all pregnant public school teachers seeking monetary, declaratory, and
injunctive relief against class of all members of Virginia school boards between 1969 and
1975 could not be maintained as a class action under rule 23(b)(2)), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1129 (1981). But see Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1238 (2d Cir. 1979) (rule
23(b)(2) is an appropriate vehicle for injunctive relief against defendant class when relief
is sought against identical behavior), vacated sub nor., Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S.
915 (1979); Thompson v. Board of Educ., 519 F. Supp. 1373, 1376-77 (W.D. Mich. 1981),
rev'd, 709 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (6th Cir. 1983) (although district court allowed certification
of defendant class under rule 23(b)(2) on the theory that the practices in question were
functionally identical, the court of appeals reversed because the rule does not contem-
plate certification of a defendant class and no state statute or general administrative
policies were involved).
198. The supreme court in Washington Educ. Ass'n gave no indication that consid-
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B. Appealability of Class Action Orders
The Washington courts have taken a notably more liberal
view of the appealability of orders granting or denying class cer-
tification than have their federal counterparts. In federal court
the grant or denial of a motion to certify a class action is not
considered a final judgment and, therefore, is not considered an
appealable order.'99 The so-called death knell doctrine was once
thought to permit an appeal from the denial of class certification
when the effect of that denial was the termination of the litiga-
tion for economic unfeasibility. 00 This view has since been
rejected, however, by the United States Supreme Court.201
Therefore, interlocutory appeals from class action orders in the
federal district courts are virtually nonexistent. 22
Washington, by contrast, has permitted interlocutory review
of class action orders by writ of mandamus, even in cases that
would not have fallen within the old federal death knell doc-
trine. In Brown v. Brown,20 for example, the trial court denied
eration of a (b)(2) defendant class would be precluded by the very wording of the rule.
The court left open further consideration of class certification only on the facts of the
case as they developed during pretrial discovery. 93 Wash. 2d at 793-94, 613 P.2d at 775.
199. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978). As a result, the deci-
sion by a trial court whether or not to let a case proceed as a class action will ordinarily
not be reviewable on appeal until after the termination of all proceedings at the trial
level. Id. at 469-70.
200. See, e.g., Hartmann v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215, 1223 (8th Cir. 1973) (order refusing
to permit class action that is not death knell of action is not appealable as a final or
interlocutory order); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966)
(court of appeals allowed interlocutory review of trial court's dismissal of class action
allegations because dismissal of class action would terminate litigation for all practical
purposes), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
201. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 (1978).
202. The only alternative basis for an interlocutory appeal from a class action order
is under the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, which requires the trial court to certify,
and the appellate court to agree, that the order from which an appeal is sought, though
not final, "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). Such
appeals are rarely accepted on class action issues. See, e.g., Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N.
Am., Inc., 550 F.2d 860, 863 (3d Cir.) (rule 23(c) determination whether to certify a class
action does not involve a "controlling question of law" that can be certified to this court
under § 1292(b)), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); Holt Constr. Co. v. Alside, Inc., 538
F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Minn.) (interlocutory appeal would not promote underlying policies
of statute), vacated, 696 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1982). But see Board of Educ. v. Climatemp,
Inc., 91 F.R.D. 245, 251 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (appeal warranted when controlling question of
law is involved, substantial ground exists for differences of opinion as to question of law,
and appeal will materially advance ultimate termination).
203. 6 Wash. App. 249, 492 P.2d 581 (1971).
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certification of a class of residential utility users who were chal-
lenging the defendant's practice of cutting off services for
alleged arrearages in payments.204 Since the plaintiffs planned to
proceed with their individual claims whether or not the class was
certified, the federal death knell doctrine would not have per-
mitted an appeal from the denial of certification.' 0 5 Further-
more, the order denying certification was clearly not a "final
judgment." Yet, the court of appeals found that the remedial
purposes behind the class action rule were sufficiently important
that a writ of mandamus was an appropriate vehicle for review
of trial court orders either denying or granting class
certification. 06
C. Mootness
The Washington courts, not being confined by the jurisdic-
tional strictures of article III of the United States Constitution,
take a decidedly more liberal approach to mootness problems
than do the federal courts.20 Nevertheless, there are some simi-
larities between the Washington and federal approaches to the
mootness question. Thus, the Washington and federal courts
have recognized that certification of a class action will excuse
later mootness problems for the named plaintiffs. 0 " Further-
204. Id. at 250, 492 P.2d at 582.
205. The court of appeals in Brown noted the then existent death knell doctrine,
but concluded that it would not apply to the facts before the court of appeals. Id. at 253,
492 P.2d at 584.
206. Id. at 253-54, 492 P.2d at 584. More recently, the Washington Supreme Court
has also granted interlocutory review. Darling v. Champion Home Builders Co., 96 Wash.
2d 701, 702, 638 P.2d 1249, 1250 (1982) (review of trial court order prohibiting communi-
cations by the parties, their counsel, and agents); Washington Educ. Ass'n v. Shelton
School Dist. No. 309, 93 Wash. 2d 783, 787, 613 P.2d 769, 772 (1980) (review of trial
court's refusal to certify the plaintiff or defendant classes). The federal courts have gen-
erally rejected mandamus as an avenue for review of interlocutory class action orders.
See, e.g., Oswald v. McGarr, 620 F.2d 1190, 1195 (7th Cir. 1980) (no mandamus when
claimed constitutional error can be adequately corrected through normal appeals pro-
cess). But see In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 1984)
(court issued writ of mandamus vacating certification order because district court failed
to make fact-finding inquiry on existence of limited fund); Pan Am. World Airways v.
United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1975) (district court's order to
notify potential plaintiffs subject to interlocutory review by mandamus).
207. The article III "case or controversy" requirement is the constitutional source of
the mootness and other justiciability doctrines that limit the judicial power of the federal
courts. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52-53, 62 (1978).
208. See, e.g., Robinson v. Peterson, 87 Wash. 2d 665, 667, 555 P.2d 1348, 1351
(1976) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), and Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975)). The courts hold that any mootness problem with the named plaintiff's claim can
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more, the Washington and federal courts agree that class certifi-
cation can cure already existing mootness problems if certifica-
tion was originally sought and improperly denied at a time when
the class representative's claims were still alive.20 ' Finally,
neither the Washington courts, nor the federal courts have per-
mitted a plaintiff whose claims have already become moot to
thereafter, for the first time, seek class certification to avoid the
mootness problem. 10
The Washington courts also seem to recognize the tradi-
tional, federally recognized exception to mootness for controver-
sies "capable of repetition, yet evading review,"2"' although the
Washington courts do not use that same catch-phrase to
describe the problem. Thus, in Johnson v. Moore,21 2 an action
on behalf of a class of prearraignment detainees was certified
even though the named plaintiffs were assumed to have been
arraigned or released by that time. Otherwise, the defendants
could avoid any challenge to their prearraignment detainment
practices by simply arraigning anyone who brought such a
challenge. 21 3
The big difference between Washington and federal practice
on mootness questions becomes apparent only in those cases
that the federal courts would dismiss on mootness grounds
because class certification was not sought in a timely fashion and
the controversy was not "capable of repetition, yet evading
be ignored because there are still class members with live claims to preserve the case or
controversy before the court. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n.11.
209. Robinson v. Peterson, 87 Wash. 2d 665, 667, 555 P.2d 1348, 1351 (1976). The
federal courts have held likewise. See, e.g., United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,
445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980) (when class certification was sought and improperly denied
before claims became moot, claims would be heard on the merits).
210. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 84 Wash. 2d 617, 623, 529 P.2d 438, 442 (1974). On the
federal level, see Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 130 (1975) (court
refused to allow plaintiffs to seek class certification after their claims had become moot).
211. The phrase originates in Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. I.C.C., 219 U.S. 498,
515 (1911). For a more recent application of the doctrine, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 110 n.11 (1975), in which a decision on the merits was permitted even though the
named plaintiff's claims had become moot before the class was certified; the nature of
the plaintiff's claim (challenging prearraignment detention) was such that it could not
possibly remain live long enough to be heard on the merits unless an exception to the
mootness doctrine was recognized.
212. 80 Wash. 2d 531, 496 P.2d 335 (1972).
213. Id. at 532-33, 496 P.2d at 335. Ironically, the factual circumstances presented in
Johnson were almost identical to those presented three years later in Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 (1975), in which the United States Supreme Court resolved the mootness
problem in the same fashion.
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review."2 4 The Washington courts, because they are not limited
by the article III case or controversy requirement, recognize an
additional significant exception to the mootness doctrine that is
unavailable in the federal courts. When a controversy was alive
at the time the action was commenced and matters of continu-
ing and substantial public interest are involved, the Washington
appellate courts will consider the matter on the merits, even if it
is by then moot, even if class certification was not sought before
it became moot, and even though the controversy was not "capa-
ble of repetition, yet evading review. '21
5
In Johnson v. Morris,"' for example, a plaintiff challenged
an ex post facto expansion of juvenile court jurisdiction. The
Washington Supreme Court was able to ignore the mootness of
the named plaintiff's individual claim, rule in his favor on his
legal challenge to the statute in question, and then decline to
review the trial court's denial of class certification on the ground
that it did not matter because the court was granting plaintiff all
the relief that he sought.217 Had the case been brought in a fed-
eral court, by contrast, the ability of the court to reach the mer-
its of plaintiff's moot claim would have depended on whether
class certification was sought in a timely fashion and whether it
was improperly denied.218
D. Attorneys' Fees
Washington follows the "American rule" on attorneys'
fees2 9-absent statutory authority to the contrary, attorneys'
fees are generally not awardable as part of the prevailing party's
costs.220 When statutory authority provides for an award of fees,
however, the status of the case as a class or individual suit
214. See, e.g., Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129-30 (1975)
(Court dismissed plaintiffs' claims as moot when no efforts had been made to formally
certify the class and the issues raised were not "capable of repetition, yet evading
review").
215. 80 Wash. 2d at 532-33, 496 P.2d at 335.
216. 87 Wash. 2d 922, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976).
217. Id. at 930 n.4, 557 P.2d at 1305 n.4.
218. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980).
219. Soper v. Clibborn, 31 Wash. App. 767, 768, 644 P.2d 738, 738 (1982). For an
extensive discussion of the origins of the "American rule," see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-60 (1975).
220. Tommy P. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 97 Wash. 2d 385, 401, 645 P.2d 697,
705 (1982).
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should not affect the availability of fees.221 Furthermore, when a
federal claim is being enforced in the Washington State courts
and federal law provides for attorneys' fees to the party prevail-
ing on that claim, Washington will enforce the attorneys' fee
provisions.
22
The only circumstances in which the class action status of a
case might affect the availability or calculation of attorneys' fees
are in cases falling into the so-called "common fund" and "pri-
vate attorney general" categories.223 When the named plaintiff's
attorney produces or preserves through successful litigation a
common fund of money for the benefit of a large group of per-
sons, the common fund doctrine permits an award of attorneys'
fees out of the entire fund. As a result, the named plaintiff does
not bear the whole burden of the fees incurred in procuring a
benefit for the group.2 24 While the Washington courts have not
yet faced a common fund class action involving attorneys' fees
questions, they have recognized the doctrine in other contexts. 225
The private attorney general doctrine permits an award of
fees against the defendant, whether or not a fund is generated
by the litigation, in cases in which the plaintiffs have prevailed
in litigation of broad societal importance that could only be
brought through private action.228 While Washington has in the
past rejected the private attorney general doctrine,2 2 7 it has
221. See, e.g., Berry v. Burdman, 93 Wash. 2d 17, 24, 604 P.2d 1288, 1292 (1980)
(attorneys' fees in action brought against the Department of Social and Health Services
authorized by state statute), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981).
222. Duranceau v. City of Tacoma, 37 Wash. App. 846, 851, 684 P.2d 1311, 1315
(1984) (federal statute authorizing attorneys' fees in civil rights action enforceable in
state court by reason of supremacy clause).
223. Cases falling into the common fund or private attorney general categories are
more likely than other cases to be class actions because of the broader spectrum of soci-
ety affected by such litigaton.
224. The common-fund doctrine is often referred to as an exception to the normal
"American rule" on attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 35, 569
P.2d 1303, 1307, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 319 (1977). However, it is not really an exception
since the fees awarded come out of the class recovery in a manner more analogous to a
contingency fee.
225. See, e.g., Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash. v. Jarvis, 58 Wash. 2d 627, 632-33, 364
P.2d 436, 439-40 (1961) (holding that attorneys' fees may be awarded under the common
fund doctrine when plaintiff preserved or created a monetary fund for benefit of himself
and others).
226. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 42-43, 569 P.2d 1303, 1312-15, 141 Cal. Rptr.
315, 324 (1977).
227. Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 362, 552 P.2d 175, 184 (1976). The
federal courts have also rejected the private attorney general doctrine. See Alyeska Pipe-
line Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (only Congress can authorize
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more recently treated the question as open.2 8
When attorneys' fees are awarded, factors that should be
considered in the trial court's determination of fees include "the
time and labor required, novelty and difficulty of questions,
required skill, values involved and results obtained, fees custom-
arily charged, and experience, reputation and ability of the
attorney."22" 9 Mechanistic formulas should be avoided 230 and,
when otherwise appropriate, fees may even exceed the amount
recovered by plaintiff. 3 '
VI. CONCLUSION
Many questions concerning class action litigation in the
Washington courts remain open.232 This is not surprising
because litigation of class actions in the state courts is, in gen-
eral, much less common than it is in the federal courts.233 What
is perhaps surprising is the number of issues concerning class
action litigation that the Washington courts have resolved. It is
quite evident that Washington attorneys do not shy away from
class action practice in the state courts.2 34 From the perspective
of plaintiffs' attorneys, there is no good reason not to bring class
actions in the state courts.
The Washington courts have not hesitated to exercise judg-
ment independent of the federal courts when interpreting and
applying the class action rule, and that judgment quite often
favors maintenance of the class action. For example, the Wash-
an exception to the "American rule" forbidding fees under private attorney general
doctrine).
228. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 540 & n.20, 585 P.2d 71,
106 & n.20 (1978).
229. Olsen Media v. Energy Sciences, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 579, 586, 648 P.2d 493,
498 (1982). The guidelines for fee awards in federal court are similar. See MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.47, at 66 (5th ed. 1982), and cases cited therein.
230. Olsen Media v. Energy Sciences, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 579, 586-87, 648 P.2d 493,
498 (1982).
231. See, e.g., Beeson v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 499, 511-12, 563 P.2d
822, 829 (1977) (award of $3600 in attorneys' fees allowed even though amount in contro-
versy was only $1000).
232. For example, questions concerning the CR 23(a)(3) typicality requirement,
supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text, the requirements of CR 23(b)(2) and (3),
supra notes 56-78 and accompanying text, or the settlement requirement of CR 23(e),
supra notes 157-75 and accompanying text.
233. 1 H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS 294 (1977).
234. Presumably the class action cases that reach the Washington appellate courts
are only a small percentage of the total number of class actions actually litigated in
Washington.
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ington courts consistently give a broad interpretation to the CR
23(a)(2) requirement of common questions, unlike many federal
courts.2 35 Furthermore, immediate appellate review of the denial
of class certification is more readily available in the Washington
courts than it is in the federal courts. 36 Also, there seems to be
much less hostility toward actions brought against defendant
classes in the Washington courts, which can make more feasible
the litigation of constitutional claims against classes of local-
level governmental entities engaged in similar challengeable
activities.23
There is a very real sense in which the Washington courts
have been able to use the class action device as it was intended,
as a useful procedural tool for managing litigation problems
rather than the "Frankenstein Monster" so often portrayed in
federal litigation.2 3 Perhaps this is, in part, because the class
actions that are brought in state court are necessarily smaller
and more manageable than those occasionally brought in federal
court. For whatever reason, however, the Washington courts
have not exhibited any of the hostility to class actions some-
times seen in the federal courts. 239 The federal courts could cer-
tainly learn something from the primarily positive experience of
the Washington courts.
235. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
237. Without the defendant class action device, either every local governmental
entity would have to be joined as a named defendant or separate suits would have to be
initiated in each county of the state. See supra notes 176-98 and accompanying text.
Another advantage to bringing civil rights class actions in the Washington courts, at least
when the state, or its agencies, or officials are defendants, is that monetary relief, barred
in the federal courts by the eleventh amendment, will often be available in the Washing-
ton courts. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
238. The class action device was first dubbed a "Frankenstein Monster" in Chief
Judge Lombard's dissenting opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572
(2d Cir. 1968) (Lombard, C.J., dissenting), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See generally
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class
Action Problem", 92 HARv. L. REv. 664 (1979).
239. Compare White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 413 (D. Colo. 1971) (sug-
gesting that an allegation of a general practice of race discrimination does not present a
common question because its ultimate resolution will turn on the facts of each individ-
ual's case) with Johnson v. Moore, 80 Wash. 2d 531, 532-33, 496 P.2d 334, 335-36 (1972)
(finding a common question concerning the propriety of defendant's general policy of
detention without hearings even though the legality of individual instances of detention
might turn on particular facts of each case).
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